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In the aftermath of East Asia’s spectacular eco-nomic collapse in mid-1997, even the most opti-mistic predictions gave at least a decade before
Asia could fully recover.1 Yet in early 2000, an IMF
study triumphantly noted that the “financial crises
that erupted in Asia beginning in mid-1997 are now
behind us and the economies are recovering strongly.” 
Indeed, the economic recovery between the sec-
ond quarter of 1999 and the last quarter of 2000
was simply astounding. South Korea, Thailand,
Malaysia, and the Philippines notched growth rates
equal to or above those just before the crisis. South
Korea made the biggest gain, its GDP growing by a
whopping 10.7 percent in 1999 and 11.2 percent in
the first half of 2000—this from a contraction of 6.7
percent in 1998. In September 1999, a two-year-old
IMF-prescribed program for South Korea was
brought to an end by the South Korean government
(an IMF program for Thailand also terminated that
month). South Korea also stopped drawing funds
from the IMF, and in August 2000 completed repay-
ment of a $19.5-billion IMF loan almost three years
ahead of schedule. By March 2000, South Korea had
accumulated such substantial reserves (from $9 bil-
lion at the end of 1997 to about $83 billion) that
the international rating agencies restored the coun-
try’s sovereign rating to investment grade (by Octo-
ber 2001, Korea’s foreign exchange reserves stood
at $100.4 billion). 
Hong Kong’s recovery has been equally impres-
sive. First-quarter growth in 2000 was 14.3 per-
cent, followed by 10.8 percent in the second
quarter. GDP growth in Singapore was 5.4 percent
in 1999, partly the result of rising productivity lev-
els. Moreover, Singapore experienced rapid growth
in its information technology industry—no doubt
benefiting from the government’s policy to trans-
form the island republic into a “wired” economy.
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand grew at
5.4, 3.2, and 5.2 percent, respectively, in the first
quarter of 2000. Only Indonesia continues to lag
behind. Indonesia, however, experienced a dra-
matic output contraction of 13.2 percent in 1998,
so its real GDP growth of 0.23 percent in 1999 was a
significant milestone. Moreover, the rupiah
strengthened to about 7,450 to the dollar in mid-
2000. And inflation, which peaked at 82 percent in
September 1998, had declined to about 1.7 percent
in December 1999. 
Other indicators of the regionwide recovery
include the steady return of capital. For example,
portfolio equity investment flows have stabilized
and turned positive with $8 billion in aggregate
inflows between 1999 and 2000. Foreign direct
investment (FDI) flows have also been positive,
largely due to sharply depreciated asset values and
exchange rates, including the relaxation of foreign
ownership rules, which have encouraged mergers
and acquisitions. The latter has been most pro-
nounced in South Korea. In fact, South Korea,
which was almost closed to FDI before the crisis,
received $15.5 billion in outside investment in
1999, five times the 1996 inflow. By early 2000, the
current accounts of South Korea, Indonesia, Thai-
land, and Malaysia were all positive, foreign cur-
rency liabilities, especially those with short
maturities had decreased, and exchange rate mis-
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1The Asian Development Bank defines East Asia as the 10
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Brunei
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myan-
mar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—plus
China and South Korea.
alignments had been largely corrected. What
explains the remarkable economic recovery? 
First, a massive financial injection totaling some
$35 billion provided by the IMF in 1998 and 1999,
and some $85 billion committed (although not all
of this actually materialized) by other multilateral
and bilateral sources, helped restore investor confi-
dence and stop further economic hemorrhaging,
especially massive currency depreciation. In South
Korea, an increase in foreign equity participation in
the financial sector has provided an additional
source of inflows. Balance of payments surpluses
have allowed the crisis-hit countries to accumulate
additional international reserves and let currencies
appreciate gradually. 
Second, financial crises do not necessarily
destroy the capacity for economic growth. Although
the Asian financial crisis exacted a heavy toll in
terms of lost output and socioeconomic disloca-
tions, it did not destroy East Asia’s industrial and
manufacturing infrastructure and its productive
capacities. The significant investments these coun-
tries made in physical plant and equipment served
them well as the global
economy picked up. 
Third, domestic fiscal
stimulus and a rebuild-
ing of inventories, com-
bined with favorable
external developments, provided Asia’s sagging
export sector a much-needed boost. Specifically, the
3 percent growth in global output greatly stimulated
the initially suppressed demand for goods and ser-
vices produced in Asia. Most important, as the nega-
tive effects of the 1996–1998 global electronics
downturn gradually reversed, the South Korean,
Malaysian, Thai, and Singaporean economies, which
depend heavily on the manufacture and exports of
electronics, including information technology–related
products, received a boost. The Korean recovery was
also helped substantially by external demand for cars
and semiconductors. Moreover, in all four countries,
service-sector output grew strongly because of
growth in telecommunications, wholesale and retail
trade, and financial services. 
Before the global economic slowdown (which
began ostensibly in the last quarter of 2000, coupled
with the uncertainty produced by September 11), the
United States economy had played an important role
in supporting global demand, accounting for more
than 50 percent of the growth of global demand.
While this was reflected in record United States cur-
rent account deficits, this deficit proved to be an
important buffer against global recession. Japan, con-
versely, has failed to live up to expectations as the
engine behind the regional economies. Although pos-
itive growth in Japan in the first half of 1999 began
to stimulate recovery in the region, it was short lived.
The return to negative growth (-0.5 percent in 2001)
weakened the stimulus to regional exports that oth-
erwise would have been created by the stronger
yen. Moreover, the Japanese government’s growth
stimulus from the 1999 fiscal package has dwin-
dled. The growth forecast for 2002 has been
marked down to 0.5 percent, partly reflecting the
global economic slowdown, but also the continu-
ing weakness of consumer confidence and under-
lying problems with the financial system. Although
growing intra-Asian trade and demand from the
European Union are expected to help fill the void,
over the long term, Japan’s recovery is undoubtedly
crucial to the region’s recovery. 
Fourth, the Asian crisis was not a current
account, but a capital account, crisis. Conventional
current account crises are caused by the deteriora-
tion of domestic macroeconomic fundamentals,
such as price inflation,
fiscal deficits, and low
rates of saving. A cap-
ital account crisis is
characterized by mas-
sive international cap-
ital inflows, usually large enough to surpass the
underlying current account deficit and composed
mainly of short-term borrowing denominated in for-
eign currencies. This leads to currency and matu-
rity mismatches, which adversely affect the balance
sheets of domestic financial institutions. 
Thus a dual financial crisis arises: a currency cri-
sis due to currency mismatch that leads to interna-
tional liquidity problems, and a domestic banking
crisis resulting in credit contraction. During the
Asian crisis, the swing of international capital from
inflows to outflows amounted to more than 20 per-
cent of GDP in Thailand. Currency depreciation fur-
ther aggravated the balance sheets of corporations
by inflating the value of liabilities in domestic cur-
rency terms, thereby precipitating a currency and
banking crisis. Further, an imbalance developed
between high levels of short-term foreign debt and
low foreign-exchange reserves. As the investor panic
(both foreign and domestic) that partly triggered the
crisis abated, capital once again started to return to
Asia. More important, FDI dominates the composi-
tion of net private flows, representing about 82 per-
cent of the total. This has allowed the economies to
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Weaknesses in the financial and corporate sectors 
were at the heart of the Asian crisis.
rebuild their official international reserves, reduce
their external liabilities, and strengthen their cur-
rencies and external current account positions. 
Fifth, prudent monetary and fiscal policy—some
domestically inspired and some promoted by the
IMF—has acted as an important catalyst for recovery.
For example, in South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia,
money-market interest rates have been broadly
unchanged since mid-1999, remaining at levels sig-
nificantly below those observed before the crisis.
Lower interest rates helped reduce the pressure on
heavily indebted corporations and helped contain the
nonperforming loan problem. With regard to fiscal
policy, in South Korea a supplementary budget
adopted in August 1999 provided a much-needed
additional stimulus while targeting a consoli-
dated central government deficit of 5 percent of
GDP for 1999. 
Sixth, luck has played an important role in Asia’s
recovery, just as it compounded underlying prob-
lems in 1997. In particular, while the El Niño and
La Niña weather phenomena devastated agricul-
tural production in 1997 and 1998, the favorable
weather conditions since 1999 have helped Indone-
sia and the Philippines reap bumper crops of rice
and other basic agricultural commodities. In addi-
tion to creating agricultural employment, it has also
eased burdens on the overstretched social safety
nets and enabled vulnerable households to better
meet their consumption needs. 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN
The last quarter of 2000 saw most East Asian
countries experience a sharp economic slowdown.
The deterioration of the external environment, due
in large part to the downturn in the United States
economy, was exacerbated by the September 11 ter-
rorist attacks. These have made the global economic
downturn deeper, longer, and more broad-based
than anticipated. Those countries that are closely
linked to the global economy through trade and
capital flows have been more adversely affected
than those where these linkages are weaker. In par-
ticular, Asian countries with a heavier dependence
on manufacturing (the production and export of
electronics in particular) have seen a larger decline
in growth. For example, South Korea’s manufactur-
ing sector grew by only 1.5 percent in the first three
quarters of 2001, compared to an average growth of
more than 18 percent between 1999 and 2000. Sim-
ilarly, in Malaysia, the manufacturing sector actu-
ally shrank by 4 percent in the first three quarters
of 2001, whereas the average growth rate was 17.4
percent in the previous two years. Singapore’s man-
ufacturing shrank by 9 percent in the first three
quarters of 2001, from an average growth rate of
more than 14 percent in the previous two years. To
varying degrees, the decelerating export demand
has been accompanied by softening domestic
demand. Indeed, slowing growth and the sharp
decline in stock prices have adversely affected both
consumer confidence and business investment.
The impact of the economic slowdown has been
reflected in growth rates. In the first three quarters
of 2001, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand together grew by only 2.5
percent. This represents a sharp deceleration from
the 7.8 percent growth they achieved in the first
three quarters of 2000. Even resilient Singapore saw
its GDP decline by 0.6 percent in the first three quar-
ters of 2001, compared to 9.5 percent growth in the
corresponding period in 2000. The impact of the
global slowdown on China has been moderate,
partly because of its lower dependence on informa-
tion technology exports and partly because of a
series of substantial fiscal stimulus measures that
have been implemented over the last four years.
Thus, China posted a growth rate of 7.6 percent in
the first three quarters of 2001. 
Another negative impact was the result of the
sharp rise in oil prices in the first six months of
2001. Although prices have since leveled off, poten-
tial oil price instability remains a major concern. The
price rise was something of a mixed blessing. It has
worked in favor of net exporters of oil such as
Indonesia and Malaysia, but against net importers
such as South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and
Thailand (in the case of Indonesia, the net effect of
higher oil prices on the government’s fiscal position
is unlikely to be substantial because increased gov-
ernment revenues will be partially offset by the
higher costs of the government fuel subsidy).
According to a 2001 Merrill Lynch report, South
Korea is most vulnerable to rising international
crude oil prices among Asian countries. The report
noted that South Korea’s oil consumption rose nearly
90 percent between 1990 and 1998 (compared with
an increase of 9 percent for the United States in the
same time period). Korea’s current account balance,
the report argues, would deteriorate significantly if
oil prices rose again or remain unpredictable. 
Another negative: the rebounds in East Asian
equity markets in 1999 declined gradually in 2000,
but sharply eroded following the September 11
attacks. The drop in equity markets has been influ-
enced by external and domestic factors. Externally,
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rising United States interest rates have triggered
downward adjustments in global equity markets,
while increased capital outflows have contributed
to the decline in stock prices. Overall, all this has
had an adverse impact on regional markets.
Another factor that has influenced regional equity
markets is the worldwide corrections in prices of
information technology stocks since the second
quarter of 2000. The information technology sector
in the affected Asian countries has expanded in
recent years, increasing their exposure to fluctua-
tions in information technology stock prices. 
Does the drop in equity markets and the gradual
currency depreciations mean that another crisis is
brewing? At this point the answer is no for a num-
ber of reasons. First, almost all the crisis-affected
countries now run current account surpluses. Sec-
ond, foreign exchange reserves have improved sig-
nificantly and more than cover the entire short-term
external debt. In fact, the short-term-to-total-debt
ratios and total external-debt-to-GDP ratios are now
lower than those seen at the height of the 1997 cri-
sis. Third, the magnitude of net private capital out-
flows is nowhere near as large as it was in 1997 and
1998. Fourth, the composition of capital being
withdrawn is also different. In 1997 and 1998, the
main problem was the nonrenewal of short-term
credit by banks and widespread investor panic.
Now the problem is scheduled debt repayments and
the slowdown or withdrawal of foreign direct
investment and portfolio capital. Fifth, the ratio of
money supply to foreign exchange reserves
(another indicator of a country’s vulnerability to a
currency crisis) has improved, and capital adequacy
ratios and profitability of banks are slowly recover-
ing. Finally, as noted earlier, the 1997 crisis was pri-
marily a capital account crisis that was exacerbated
by pegged, and ultimately unsustainable, exchange
rates. Since then, most East Asian countries have
moved toward more flexible exchange-rate regimes,
which should enable them to adjust to external
shocks more smoothly.
RESTRUCTURING AND REFORMS:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES
As is now well known, weaknesses in the finan-
cial and corporate sectors were at the heart of the
Asian crisis. This situation developed because rapid
financial liberalization had outpaced institutional-
legal capacities. Vulnerabilities accumulated and put
at risk the solvency of large parts of the economy.
Reforming these sectors has been a top priority for
individual state governments. The crisis-affected
countries have followed differing approaches to
financial and corporate sector restructuring. The res-
olution of financial system distress happens in two
phases: “containment” and “restructuring.” The con-
tainment or “distress resolution” phase occurs with
the onset of a financial crisis, when there is a major
loss of confidence in the financial system. The key
aim during this phase is to quickly stabilize the
financial system and prevent a credit crunch. The
usual strategy is to provide large-scale liquidity sup-
port to financial institutions and limit losses by clos-
ing unviable banks. The crisis-affected Asian
countries are now well beyond the containment
stage. Currently in the restructuring and rehabilita-
tion phase, the governments of Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, and Thailand have intervened in nonviable
financial institutions, recapitalized some of the viable
but weak institutions, and have begun to take steps
to improve prudential regulation and supervision.
In South Korea, because of the extremely tight
liquidity conditions prevailing in late 1997 and
early 1998, many of the country’s banks encoun-
tered difficulty refinancing their maturing obliga-
tions. To avoid large-scale bank defaults, the
government in March 1998 offered to guarantee the
short-term debts incurred by Korean banks. This
guarantee was provided in the form of an
“exchange offer” under which creditors were per-
mitted to exchange short-term bank debt for newly
issued one- to three-year government-guaranteed
loans. As a result, among the crisis-affected coun-
tries, Korea has made the most progress in financial
restructuring; debt-equity ratios have fallen by
about half since 1997. The Indonesian government
later used a similar exchange offer as a model to
carry out a bank debt-exchange program. The
Malaysian and Thai governments have fostered
banking consolidation through the liquidation of
weak banks, mergers of viable banks, the strength-
ening of the capital base of the surviving institu-
tions, and the creation of a mechanism for the
disposal of nonperforming loans.
The transfer of problem loans from banks’ bal-
ance sheets to asset management companies (AMCs)
has accounted for a significant part of the improve-
ment in the nonperforming loan ratios since the
financial crisis. Both Thailand and Malaysia have
created new institutions similar to Indonesia’s
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) and
Asset Management Unit to manage the bank-
restructuring process. Overall, Malaysia has been
relatively successful in taking over nonperforming
loans. By the end of 1999, recapitalization require-
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ments for the financial sector had been largely met,
and the ratio of nonperforming to total loans in the
financial system had fallen to around 25 percent. 
Thailand has opted for a strategy of virtually clos-
ing the nonbank financial sector but letting banks
deal with problem loans on a decentralized basis.
This means that commercial banks have to meet
Bank for International Settlements capital adequacy
ratios by raising additional capital, including from
foreign investors. To facilitate this, the Thai govern-
ment has increased the limit of foreign ownership
from 25 percent to 100 percent of total equity. While
four banks were sold in 1998–1999 to foreign banks,
privatization has remained slow and hesitant. As of
September 2001, nonperforming loans in the bank-
ing sector stood at 12.9 percent of total outstanding
loans, representing a decline from 17.9 percent in
December 2000. Much of the improvement, how-
ever, is the result of the transfer of impaired assets
of state-owned banks to AMCs—and only partly due
to the progress of corporate debt restructuring. 
In effect, distressed assets in the entire financial 
system, including those transferred to AMCs, remain 
at 25.3 percent
of total loans. 
In Indonesia,
financial-sector
restructuring is
lagging, partly
because the financial distress induced by the crisis
has been deeper and more widespread and the fis-
cal resources are constrained by the massive debt-
servicing costs arising from the recapitalization of
the banking sector. The ratio of nonperforming
loans to total loans remains high. Most of the finan-
cial sector is still in a precarious position, and less
than 30 percent of the banking system remains pri-
vately held. Financial-sector restructuring in
Indonesia needs to remain focused on operational
restructuring of the state banks and moving ahead
with loan-recovery efforts.
Clearly much still needs to be done. Inadequate
regulation, weak supervision of financial institutions,
poor accounting standards and disclosure rules, out-
moded laws, and weak corporate governance remain
a problem. Moreover, most banks are still heavily
burdened with large volumes of nonperforming
loans, many of which may ultimately have a rela-
tively low recovery rate. A large number of corpora-
tions still have debt levels beyond their capacity to
service and inefficient investments that are econom-
ically nonviable. The red in the balance sheets of
banks and corporations is huge, and it will take some
time to write off problem loans and failed invest-
ments. Given this, effectively tackling the high lev-
els of nonperforming loans and corporate debt is the
biggest challenge facing these economies. Indeed, 
to minimize the risks, financial-sector restructuring
needs to be accelerated. Restructuring should 
be multipronged, with governments working to
improve the prudential regulation and supervision
of financial intermediaries, to introduce new stan-
dards for data dissemination, and to implement cor-
porate-bankruptcy reforms. This may include closing
insolvent institutions or merging them into viable
entities, recapitalizing viable but illiquid institutions,
and developing a framework for debt resolution.
Overall, the recapitalization of commercial banks,
improved loan recovery, and asset sales must receive
top priority. The resulting revenue will greatly help
offset the high budgetary cost of restructuring. 
East Asian governments have pursued various
approaches to corporate restructuring. One popular
voluntary method has involved mergers and acqui-
sitions (M&As). The number of M&As, particularly
those that are cross-border, have increased sharply in
the crisis-affected
countries. Total
cross-border
M&As—defined
as acquisitions
of more than 50
percent of equity by foreign investors—increased
from some $3 billion in 1996 to about $22 billion in
1999. The largest rise was in Korea, accounting for
roughly $13 billion of M&As in 1999. No doubt,
while this wave of M&As has been triggered by
important policy changes, including the liberalization
of investment in nontraded sectors and changes in
competition policy, much of the M&A activity has
been concentrated in such activities as wholesale and
retail trade, real estate, and financial services. In other
sectors, governments have followed different strate-
gies. For example, in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and
Thailand, problem debts of large corporations are
being worked out voluntarily among creditors under
government-sponsored processes or being liquidated
and restructured under court supervision. The debts
of smaller firms are mainly being dealt with on an
out-of-court basis or through bankruptcy procedures.
Also, financial-sector restructuring, including reforms
on bankruptcy and corporate governance, has been
supporting the process of corporate restructuring. In
fact, government-owned AMCs are at the forefront,
helping alleviate financial burdens of corporations
and holding large amounts of nonperforming loans. 
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The East Asian economies must push ahead 
the ongoing process of market opening and deregulation.
The progress in corporate restructuring, how-
ever, has been modest. Asset disposition has been
slow due to the difficulty in valuing assets, thin
markets for selling assets, and fear of selling them
too cheaply. Moreover, many banks not only have
insufficient capacity to absorb losses without facing
a serious threat of closure, but in most countries
they operate with a full government guarantee on
their liabilities, reducing any real incentive to
undertake fundamental restructuring. And most
banks have a limited technical capacity to restruc-
ture, while their long-standing links with corpora-
tions have complicated the restructuring process. 
Undoubtedly, corporate restructuring, with
emphasis on workouts with creditors that provide for
debt restructuring and operational restructuring to
restore competitiveness and profitability, must be
pursued aggressively. The results so far have been
decidedly mixed. South Korea has made considerable
progress—partly because of government policies that
required corporations to bring their debt-equity ratio
down to 200 percent. Although some Korean corpo-
rations have achieved this by using various account-
ing measures, including overvaluation of affiliated
party transactions and revaluations of securities and
foreign-exchange holdings, progress surely has been
made. In particular, through court-supervised
receiverships and out-of-court workouts, the con-
trolling shareholders and management of many large
chaebols (conglomerates) have completely lost out or
seen their shareholdings severely diluted and their
managerial discretion circumscribed. 
Much still remains to be done to restructure
investment trust companies and other nonbank
financial institutions, such as insurance companies.
But the restructuring of Daewoo and the breakup of
the Hyundai Group send an important signal of the
authorities’ resolve to pursue far-reaching changes in
traditional business arrangements. Nevertheless,
despite the reduction in the number of large chaebols
from 30 to 16, the exposure level of financial insti-
tutions to chaebols remains relatively high. Clearly,
carrying out restructuring by relying on extensions
of maturities and the lowering of interest payments
and other financial relief measures cannot continue
indefinitely. Given the links among the chaebols,
banks, and investment trust companies, financial
problems in the latter can quickly undermine both
corporate and financial-sector restructuring. Push-
ing for deep restructuring is therefore essential. 
To promote a more efficient management of non-
performing loans and enhance corporate restruc-
turing, the Thai government established the Thai
Asset Management Corporation (TAMC) in June
2001. The TAMC’s goal is to acquire about half the
financial system’s nonperforming loans, including
almost all (1.1 trillion baht) of state banks’ nonper-
forming loans and about one-quarter (250 billion
baht) of the private banks’ nonperforming loans. It
is too early to judge the TAMC’s success. In the case
of Malaysia, by June 2000 the Corporate Debt
Restructuring Committee (whose task is to oversee
voluntary corporate-debt workouts) had already
restructured debts of 25 companies. Corporate prob-
lems still persist, however. Many Malaysian firms
remain heavily indebted and are unable to service
their debt obligations. Moreover, the government
continues to support firms it considers strategically
important, thereby hindering resolution to corpo-
rate-sector indebtedness. Finally, restrictions on for-
eign ownership have also played a role in Malaysia’s
failure to benefit from the M&As that have become
increasingly important as a source of regional for-
eign direct investment since the crisis.
In Indonesia, although the Jakarta Initiative for
Voluntary Debt workouts finalized agreements to
restructure the bulk of the country’s corporate debt
by the end of 2000, little has been achieved. The
IBRA’s progress has been slow, with an assets-recovery
rate of only about 10 percent or less; as of September
2001, the IBRA had disposed of only 6 percent of its
huge nonperforming assets. At the heart of the prob-
lem are the low-quality assets of many Indonesian
banks. This is reflected in the nonperforming loan
level, which was 15.8 percent in July 2001. Other
impediments to the IBRA’s performance include polit-
ical instability, an ineffective bankruptcy system, and
a lack of interested buyers. In the first half of 2001,
the IBRA managed to book only 11.2 trillion rupiah in
cash revenue, about one-third of its target for 2001.
Of course, the slow pace of corporate-debt restruc-
turing continues to hamper economic recovery. In
the longer term, fiscal consolidation will depend on
success in raising sufficient revenues through asset
sales of the IBRA, improved tax collection, and priva-
tization of state enterprises.
REMAINING TASKS
Beyond financial- and corporate-sector reforms,
the East Asian economies must push ahead the
ongoing process of market opening and deregula-
tion, including further trade liberalization and sim-
plification of business licensing requirements.
These measures are needed to improve the envi-
ronment for private investment, especially to attract
new foreign direct investments and enhance pro-
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ductivity growth. Moreover, these economies must
continue with the adoption of measures designed
to increase transparency in the financial, corporate,
and government sectors. Reducing government-
directed credits, increasing capital adequacy ratio,
strengthening regulation of financial intermedia-
tion, as well as amending (and in some cases pass-
ing) laws to strengthen central bank independence,
competition policy, bankruptcy procedures, and
anticorruption measures will go a long way to
ensure that capital is prudently invested. Indeed, it
is tempting to say that had these measures been in
place, the Asian financial crisis may never have
erupted, or that its impact may not have been as
severe. Hong Kong and Singapore better withstood
the crisis’s contagious effects because of their strong
and well-capitalized banks, effective liquidation
laws, sound regulatory infrastructure, and disclo-
sure standards that are among the best in the world. 
Economic recovery cannot be sustainable if it
remains based mainly on fiscal stimulus. However,
despite a rapid debt buildup for similar reasons,
South Korea’s debt-to-GDP ratio remains relatively
low, reflecting the country’s favorable debt position
before the crisis. Public-debt accumulation during
the crisis was less rapid in Malaysia and the Philip-
pines, but these countries already had higher pre-
crisis public-debt burdens. While a full resumption
of output growth and, for foreign-currency-denom-
inated debt, real exchange-rate appreciations are
expected to help reduce public-debt-to-GDP ratios
from their current peak levels, deficit reduction
and asset recovery from nonperforming loans taken
over from the financial sector will be critical.
Indonesia faces an especially acute fiscal challenge,
since it must carefully weigh the balance between
supporting the recovery and continuing fiscal con-
solidation. With public debt above 90 percent of
GDP, and with further rounds of bank recapitaliza-
tion still required, the authorities face a difficult
task. At a minimum, they must properly sequence
and implement a fiscal decentralization program.
They must meet the financing needs stemming
from the budget deficit. 
Finally, the financial crisis left widespread socio-
economic distress in its wake. The economic col-
lapse in the worst-affected countries resulted in
massive job losses and bankruptcies as cutbacks in
production multiplied. In addition, the sharp rise in
inflation (in the context of a considerably weakened
labor market) exacted a heavy toll in terms of falling
real wages and incomes. The combined effects of
higher unemployment, inflation, and the absence of
a meaningful social safety net pushed thousands of
people into poverty. Of all the crisis-affected coun-
tries, only South Korea had an unemployment-insur-
ance system prior to the crisis—albeit the program,
just introduced in 1995, provided only limited cov-
erage. Nevertheless, much can be learned from the
Korean social “safety net” program. Specifically,
expansionary fiscal policies in 1998 and 1999 were
critical in stemming the economic downturn. Social-
protection spending was increased threefold: from
0.6 percent in 1997 to 2.0 percent in 1999. 
The government used three main instruments of
social protection to help the unemployed, the poor,
and the elderly—the most vulnerable sectors of soci-
ety. First, the Korean government expanded its
nascent unemployment insurance program by
including all firms (from the original firms with more
than 30 employees), shortened the contribution
period required for eligibility, and extended the dura-
tion of unemployment benefits. This expanded the
eligible workforce from 5.7 million workers at the
beginning of 1998 to 8.7 million at the end of the
year. Beneficiaries increased tenfold, from around
18,000 in January 1998 to 174,000 in March 1999.
Yet, this still only constituted 10 percent of the
unemployed workforce. Since most of Korea’s jobless
did not benefit from the expansion of unemployment
insurance, the government introduced a temporary
public-work program in May 1998, enrolling 76,000
workers. By January 1999, the program was provid-
ing 437,000 jobs. By the first quarter of 1999, the
public-work program was benefiting around 2.5
times as many people as the unemployment-insur-
ance program. Further, in May 1998, the government
introduced a temporary livelihood-protection pro-
gram with funding to cover 750,000 beneficiaries. It
also introduced a means-tested noncontributory
social pension for 600,000 elderly people. 
The Korean case shows that the victims of the
crisis can be sheltered without compromising
macroeconomic reforms. As noted earlier, the ini-
tial IMF programs in Thailand, South Korea, and
Indonesia required fiscal tightening that allowed
very little room for increased social expenditures.
In hindsight, such policies proved to be ill advised.
While many social support systems have been
introduced in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia,
these countries need to do much more to protect
the most vulnerable sectors of society. Continuing
investments in health, education, and general wel-
fare of the population should be a priority. 
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